Paper:ewp-mac/0004020 From: Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2000 00:19:47 -0500
This paper studies the effects of local interactions on the distribution of employment in a Keynesian-type model with strategic complementarities. It is shown that rational expectations generate symmetric equilibria for any interaction structure except autarky. Under adaptive expectations, the distribution of employment converges to a rational expectations equilibrium, implying that asymmetric equilibria, or inequality, cannot persist in the long run. On the basis of both analytical and computational results, however, it is shown that symmetric equilibria are unstable in the sense that, in the presence of noise, local interactions can produce globally persistent inequality.
EconWPA began as a conversation between Bob Parks and Larry Blume on January 28, 1993. I located Paul Ginsparg's archive (then xxx.lanl.gov) and he graciously installed his software on a Sun Sparc system which was supporting the department of economics email and computation. EconWPA began accepting papers July 1, 1993 and had ftp, email, gopher and web interfaces. The web interface for submissions was engineered into existence in July 1995. A complete and catastrophic machine failure in 1999 caused the loss of EconWPA's email new paper announcment service at which time there were over 15,000 subscriptions with over 8,000 unique email addresses.

I was told that I could keep operating EconWPA (as well as many other services including rfe.wustl.edu, barnett.wustl.edu, and three RePEc servers) but I would receive no support (hardware, software, or anthing else) and (as had been the case) no compensation. At that point, given the apparent low valuation of my activities by the department, and university, it made no sense for me to continue operating EconWPA or other services.
Thanks to all who have supported EconWPA in the past.
A Chinese curse states May you live in intersting times. I have. Bob Parks - Jan 2006